The purpose of this paper is to provide an economic analysis of the space industry’s Spacekeeping Sector.  This sector encompasses the activities associated with space debris/spacecraft removal from orbit.  This paper will evaluate this sector in terms of the economic factors supply, demand, framework, market trends, inter-sector dependencies, and overall feasibility.

BACKGROUND

On April 12, 1961, Yuri Gagarin began mankind’s exploration and exploitation of space.  In the subsequent 37 years we have seen quantum leaps in technology and the accumulation of debris in space.   The space industry goals over this time period were focused on  technological advances not the preservation of the space environment for future use.  The result is 35,117,000 objects in near-Earth space with an estimated mass of approximately 2,000,000kg [NSTCC 1995] and growing.  Out of the total objects occupying near-Earth space there are approximately 350 operational spacecraft [Bates 1997] the rest are debris or garbage.  The types of debris that exist fall into the following categories: [AIAA 1992, 1-16]

(1)  Discarded rocket bodies/stages - Launch vehicle upper stages (17%);

(2)  Inactive payloads/spacecraft - Spacecraft that have had a catastrophic system failure or have past their functional lifetime due to propellant depletion or programmatic decision (23%);

(3)  Operational Debris - Spacecraft or launch vehicle parts released as part of operations, deployment, or anomaly (e.g. lens covers, payload shrouds, bolts, pyrotechnic material, surface degradation material, solid rocket ejecta and biological remains) (12%);

(4)  Collision and Explosion Fragments - Debris resultant from debris and space vehicle (spacecraft or launch vehicle) collision or any combination of the two and that debris which is the result of an intentional or unintentional explosion of a space vehicle or space vehicle part (42%).

(1)  Debris less than 0.01cm -  Causes surface pitting and erosion which may have significant effect on the spacecraft after long exposures.

(2)  Debris 0.01cm to 1cm - Causes significant impact damage which can be serious depending on spacecraft system design.

(3)  Debris larger than 1cm - Causes significant damage and may cause the catastrophic loss of the spacecraft.

PREREQUISITE INTERSECTOR COOPERATION

Spacekeeping alone will not eliminate the potential for the loss of usable near-Earth space without intersector cooperation.  Historically, launch and in-orbit operations have been performed with little regard for the generation of debris.  In addition, the space industry as a whole has taken little action with regard to the management of existing debris except to monitor and catalog its existence to  avoid collisions.

Today, NASA Policy NSS 1740.14, NASA Policy Directive 8710.XX, DOD Space Policy 1987, and the following national and international positions require that debris generation mitigation is to be performed [NSTCC 1995, Part 2].
 

“...All space sectors will seek to minimize the creation of space debris. Design and operations of space tests, experiments, and systems will strive to minimize or reduce accumulation of space debris consistent with mission requirements and cost effectiveness...”  The November 1989 Presidential Directive [AIAA 1992, 9]

“...Recognizing that space debris constitutes an unacceptable (man-made) risk to man and materials in space and on ground, the objective for the future must be to minimize the consequences of the existence of space debris and minimize the creation of additional space debris...” 1989 ESA Position [AIAA 1992, 10]

In addition,  ‘The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’ states that states/governments are responsible for the activities of their nationals and themselves and are not allowed to cause “potentially harmful interference with the activities of other parties” [NSTCC 1995].   This statement when evaluated in terms of spacekeeping would mean that a collision with a spacecraft/debris or debris generation would be considered harmful interference.  Therefore the Space Surveillance Sector, the Space Transportation Sector, and all in-orbit operations sectors must support debris management in addition to the establishment of a Spacekeeping Sector to be truly compliant with today’s policies and treaties.

Specifically, the Space Surveillance Sector debris management support that is required to be compliant with today’s policies and treaties is the collecting of observatory data (currently optical and radar data), producing accurate and up-to-date space debris location/path catalogs to prevent collisions, and supplying predictions of where and when a space object will reenter [SPACECOM 1997].  This support is currently in place, at a cost of over $300 Million (See Appendix A), but observatory data is limited by the currently developed optical and radar technology that limits reliable debris detection to those objects 1cm or greater.  Therefore due to these limits supplemental technologies and simulations have been used and are being developed to increase the accuracy of this service.   The continuation of support from the Space Surveillance Sector will serve to provide accurate data to locate debris to be eliminated by the Spacekeeping Sector and assist in collision avoidance/debris generation.

Additionally, the debris management support that is required to be compliant with today’s policies and treaties from the Space Transportation Sector and all the in-orbit operations sectors is the mitigation of debris generation and the reduction of the potential for collisions and explosions.  Launch operations and in-orbit operations can produce operational debris and the potential for collision and explosion fragments while launch operations can also produce discarded rocket bodies/stages.  Therefore launch vehicle and spacecraft operators and manufacturers can take the following actions to mitigate this possibility and remain compliant with the aforementioned policies: [AIAA 1992, 19-21]
 

(1) Launch vehicle manufacturers can modify launch vehicle upper stages to accelerate orbital decay and guarantee their re-entry.  This can be done by the adding of a drag augmentation device or active de-orbiting (planned for Ariane-5 [Eichler 1992, 196-202]).   Drag augmentation, such as a drag balloon, requires the addition of additional hardware and control procedures for it to work and is limited to low altitudes [Petro 1989, 169-182].  Active de-orbit requires that the resultant individual stage be capable of attitude control and command processing to perform the de-orbit maneuver [AIAA 1992, 19-21] or incorporation of a passive deceleration system as used by the Russians.

(2) Launch vehicle and spacecraft manufacturers/operators can modify deployment systems to avoid the deposit of debris in orbit.  Lanyards and debris trapping devices can be added to both spacecraft and launch vehicles to minimize the creation of operational debris such as instrument covers and pyrotechnic material.

(3) Launch vehicle and spacecraft manufacturers/operators can modify deployment operations to avoid the deposit of debris in orbit.   This action would require that the release times for operational debris, such as payload shrouds, be changed so that the releases occur at low enough altitudes to ensure quick re-entry and elimination.

(4) Collision and explosion fragment debris comes from those uncontrolled objects that remain in space and can not be removed.  Launch vehicle and spacecraft manufacturers/operators can modify end-of-life (EOL) capabilities and procedures to minimize this hazard.  Specifically, both groups can perform passivation procedures to avoid explosion and/or relocate their space objects to avoid collision.  Passivation requires spacecraft or launch vehicle manufacturers to provide for stored energy (i.e., batteries and propulsion) dissipation.  One passivation technique is the passivation of batteries which can be done by managing them to an EOL full discharge and then subsequently short-circuiting them.  Another passivation technique is the passivation of propulsion systems which requires spacecraft or launch vehicle manufacturers to provide for propellant/pressurant venting and/or fuel depletion burns.  Relocation requires that spacecraft and launch vehicle manufacturers provide an EOL maneuvering capability  that can take their space object (i.e., a launch vehicle upper stage or an entire satellite) to another orbit.  In the case of debris this relocation can be to disposal orbit higher than GEO orbits to avoid collision.

A lack of intersector cooperation as described above will result in the continuation of the current rate of debris production which will by far overpower the proposed clean-up efforts of the Spacekeeping Sector in a very short time.  The onus is on the space industry regulatory commissions and customers to demand that the policies referenced above be enforced beyond the limited voluntary compliance that exists today to avoid the loss of usable near-Earth space.   If compliance is enforced the Spacekeeping Sector’s activities will then be able to be effective in mitigating the dangers posed by the remaining objects in space which will still double in 50 years [NRC 1995, 167-172] even with intersector cooperation.
 

SECTOR SUPPLY

Product/Service:  Spacekeeping is the service of providing debris/spacecraft removal. This service consists of collecting and removing debris or spacecraft that have no means of removing themselves from usable orbits or, in the best case, from space.  The concepts of how to perform such a service vary according to the debris to be removed and are listed below divided into the categories of large and small debris removal with the applicable debris types, as defined earlier, identified.
 

Concepts for discarded rocket bodies/stages debris and inactive payloads/ spacecraft debris (large debris) removal:

1. The University of Braunschweig concept of using a remover space vehicle that would decrease the orbital energy of debris by transferring that energy to itself causing the debris to re-enter and burn-up [Eichler 1992, 196-202]:  Specifically, the retrieval process combines the two space objects, changing their orbital dynamics.  The remover climbs and the debris falls.  Until separation of the two objects, the debris is stabilized by local gravity gradient forces along the vertical without changing its orbital velocity.   Separation of the two objects will therefore cause the released debris, which is now at a new lower altitude with the same velocity it needed to sustain the higher altitude, to fall and eventually re-enter.   Conversely at separation the remover will be sent into an elliptical orbit because its speed at separation is not appropriate for its mass and orbit height.  The remover can then use this new elliptical orbit as a transfer orbit for its next mission.  An alternative implementation of the same concept is the use of NASA’s Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) to directly de-orbit debris.  Cost estimates for the OMV-type implementation are $15-20Million per remover [Petro 1989, 185-186].  Due to the great similarities of these two implementation strategies for the same concept the OMV estimate can be presumed to also be valid for a Braunschweig remover.  However, the range of these types of devices is limited by their propulsion or energy transfer capabilities which would therefore require the use of multiple removers to make a significant impact on debris population.

2. The concept of using NASA’s Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) to retrieve and attach a controllable propulsive de-orbit package or commandable drag augmentation device [Petro 1989, 169-182]:  In this concept the OMV would retrieve the space debris and while grappled to it robotically attach either a propulsive de-orbit package or drag augmentation device (e.g., drag balloon).  The OMV would then release the debris at which point the newly attached devices would be activated.  Debris would then de-orbit or begin drag induced orbital decay to re-entry.  As stated earlier NASA’s Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) cost estimate is $15-20Million per vehicle therefore the costs of this type of removal would be that cost plus the cost of each propulsive package, estimated at $7,800,000, or the cost of each drag augmentation device, estimated at $5,000,000-$15,000,000 [Petro 1989, 185-186].

3. The University of Arizona concept of an Autonomous Space Processor for Orbital Debris (ASPOD)[Bates 1997]:  This concept is one of an orbital robot with grappling hooks and gathering arms that would collect large debris and process the debris for re-entry or re-cycling.  The associated debris processing in this concept is the cutting up of debris with a sun-powered torch and packaging it for re-entry burn-up or Earth return and recycling.  The cost estimate to build a device like this is $5Million and is expected to have low operating costs.

• Concepts for operational debris and collision/explosion fragment debris (small debris):

1. The concept of using unfolded films 8km in diameter and 20?m thick to slow and destroy (to <0.1cm particles) and/or partially evaporate debris due the characteristics of high velocity (> 15km/s) collisions [Diobyshevski 1995,151-154].  This concept has two problems unless it is enhanced.  The first problem is the avoidance of destroying or colliding with operational objects and the second is the disposal of the used film.  Both issues can be resolved by enhancing this concept to include a controlling bus to the center of the film capable of both controlled avoidance and de-orbit maneuvering.  However, this concept will only handle objects up to 3 cm and will take 20 years to accomplish its task and is therefore felt to be unfeasible.

2. The Marshall Space Flight Center’s Jonathan W. Campbell laser illumination concept [Bates 1997]:  This concept would use a laser focused on debris targets between 1/2” to 4” to disturb their orbit.  Once a debris object’s orbit is disturbed it is presumed that it will fall and be destroyed during re-entry.  Current laser and tracking technologies limit the size and range this type of service could eliminate to debris 1/2” to 4”  at less than 500 miles.  Research is on-going on this concept via the Orion Project and is expected to cost $100Million to perform.

3. The concept of using ‘sweeper’ devices to gather small debris [Petro 1992, 180-184]:  This concept would employ one or more spacecraft with large stationary or rotating panels that would collect small debris.  The spacecraft(s) would orbit until bus EOL or debris collection panel saturation at which point the craft would be removed as described above or de-orbit itself.   Cost estimates for operation of such a system are expected to be large but have not been quantified beyond that.

4. The Johnson Space Center’s Donald Kessler foam balloon concept:  This concept would be to place 1 mile wide foam filled balloons in Earth orbit [Petro 1992, 180-184].  Once a balloon was in orbit debris would collide with the balloons and either become embedded or slow down enough that the debris would be bound for re-entry.  This concept has two basic problems unless it is enhanced.  The first problem is the avoidance of destroying or colliding with operational objects and the second is the disposal of used balloons.  Both issues can be resolved by enhancing this concept to include a controlling bus to the balloons capable of both controlled avoidance and de-orbit maneuvering.  However, the collision avoidance required for something 1 mile wide is currently thought to be extremely difficult and may require concept refinement prior to any attempt at implementation.

5. The concept of electrically charging debris to cause orbit decay and re-entry [Petro 1992, 185]:  This extremely speculative concept theorizes that once a debris object is charged its interaction with the Earth’s magnetic field will cause orbital decay to occur more rapidly.  Much more research is needed to refine this concept before even basic feasibility predictions can be made.

Today there is no supply for this service.  In the future this service may become a necessity to ensure safe space operations but due to the large infrastructure required to perform such a service and high equipment development costs the supply will probably be inelastic.

Costs:  The costs (vehicle, launch, operations, liability) associated with providing this type of service with any of the concepts will probably be very high, as indicated above.   However since both spacekeeping and on-orbit servicing (a new sector also in infancy) would both require the development of retrieval vehicles, on-orbit operations platforms and/or robotics the two sectors could collaborate and reduce costs.  The joint development of systems that could provide both servicing or removal would greatly lower the cost of removing each piece of debris from the figures indicated above.  In addition, launch and liability insurance costs which are high across the space industry could also be shared in this type of collaboration plan.  Lastly,  costs could also be defrayed by the development of revenue generating spin-offs from the Spacekeeping Sector’s removal service.  One such spin-off  could be the recycling of the material or equipment gathered.

Suppliers:  There are no suppliers of this service today.  However, in the future this service could be supplied by one or more of the classic space contractors or by an international consortium whose sole purpose is providing this service.  The latter supplier solution eliminates difficult ownership and financial responsibility issues (See Framework Section) that may never be resolved and therefore appears to be the most logical choice.

SECTOR DEMAND

Today there is no demand for this service.  The removal of objects from orbit no matter what concept is implemented is not currently supported by industry due to the costs of developing such a service.  Although according to a interagency National Security Council report,

“...left unchecked, the growth of debris could substantially threaten the safe and reliable operations of manned and unmanned spacecraft in the next century.” [Lee 1992, 211]

As stated earlier, this service may eventually become a necessity to ensure safe space operations.   Therefore the demand for this service will not greatly change with small changes in price or, simply, the demand will probably be inelastic.

SECTOR FRAMEWORK

No specific spacekeeping policies or markets exist today since this sector is still only speculative.  However, in the event that this service is eventually deemed necessary or desirable by the space community, which appears to be inevitable, several political, legal, and economic questions will need to be answered.   These questions begin with simply  ‘Who owns and is responsible for debris?’.  Thus far the position of the space community has been that the nation of origin owns and is responsible for a space object or the debris from that object forever as defined in the ‘The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’ [NSTCC 1995].  However, with this definition of ownership and responsibility nations are vulnerable to tort-type claims for damage caused by their debris and to handle (physically and financially) debris removal nationally.  This is probably not the most efficient approach to debris management.  To increase efficiency,  it could be permitted for another nation or global organization to remove debris/spacecraft owned by someone else.  If such actions are permitted then ‘Who pays for the removal service?’.   This final question of payment may lead the space community to re-define space object ownership limits to allow for innovative funding solutions that would not burden individual spacecraft providers.  One such innovative solution being the creation of an international fund to pay for or subsidize the services provided by this sector.  This fund would get mandated contributions from all space operating entities or debris owners which would pay for the performance of removal services [Eichler 1992, 203] or the development of technology to support such services.  Therefore the establishment of this fund and its associated international agreements will probably need to be the first step in the birth of this sector.

After considering these questions and their possible solutions, one can see that the market for this sector would probably not be a free market but instead a wholly or partially subsidized market.

SECTOR’S OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

Debris will never cease to exist as long as there are activities in space.  Debris if unmanaged or not removed will eventually overwhelm near-Earth space and produce the environment conducive to domino type catastrophic collisions.  As stated earlier,  intersector cooperation alone will not significantly reduce the debris population or  avoid the overwhelming of near-Earth space.  However, in conjunction with an active debris elimination plan a viable revenue making space environment can be ensured for the future.  Regrettably, the high cost of developing this sector to support such a plan may require significant spacecraft or life losses to inspire support from the space community.   However once this support is realized the concepts presented here for this sector’s service could become a reality and possibly revenue generating (recycling) opportunities for future entrepreneurs.  Therefore the outlook for this sector in the future is good.
 

RESOURCES USED

[Johnson 1997]Johnson, Stephen B (1997), The Commercialization of Space, Department of Space Studies, University of North Dakota, Class Lectures.

 [AIAA 1992]AIAA, Orbital Debris Mititgation Techniques: Technical, Legal, and Economic Aspects, AIAA SP-016-1992 (Washington, D.C.: AIAA, 1992).

[NRC 1995]National Research Council, Orbital Debris: A Technical Assessment  (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995).

[Eichler 1992]Eichler, P.  et al, “AIAA-90-1366 Removal of Debris from Orbit,” Orbital Debris: Technical Issues and Future Directions , NASA Conference Publication 10077 (Houston, Texas: Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, 1992).

[Lee 1992]Lee, J.  et al, “AIAA-90-1368 Technology Requirements for the Disposal of Space Nuclear Power Sources and Implications for Space Debris Management Strategies,” Orbital Debris: Technical Issues and Future Directions , NASA Conference Publication 10077 (Houston, Texas: Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, 1992).

[Petro 1992]Petro, A., “AIAA-90-1364 Techniques for Debris Control,” Orbital Debris: Technical Issues and Future Directions , NASA Conference Publication 10077 (Houston, Texas: Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, 1992).

[Bates 1997]Bates, Karl L. E. et al, “Man-Made Cosmic Debris Creates Hazards for Increasingly Cluttered Space,” Detroit News Online, http://www.detnews.com/1997/ discover/9703/311/03310047.htm, March 31, 1997.

[Diobyshevski 1995]Diobyshevski, E., “Using Large Spread Films for Destruction and Elimination of Anthropogenic Debris in Space, ”16:11 (1995): 151-154.

[Petro 1989]Petro, A. et al, “Removal of Orbital Debris,” Orbital Debris from Upper Stage Breakup, (Washington, D.C.: 1989).

[NSTCC 1995]The National Science and Technology Council Committee on Transportation Research & Development, “Interagency Report on Orbital Debris 1995,” JSC, http://www-sn.jsc.nasa.gov/Debris/Report95.html, 1995.

 [Wilson 1996]Wilson, J., “Killer Garbage in Space,” Popular Mechanics, http://popularmechanics.com/popmech/sci/9608STSPM.html,  August 1996.

[AP 1997]Associated Press, “Space Trash Threatens Satellites,” Florida Today Space Online, http://www.flatoday.com/space/explore/stories/1997/032197d.htm,  March 21, 1997.

[SPACECOM 1997]SPACECOM, “Space Surveillance,” US Space Command Space Surveillance Home Page, http://www.spacecom.af.mil/usspace/space.htm, 1997.

 [Petro 1989]Petro, A. et al, “Cost Estimates for Removal of Orbital Debris,” Orbital Debris from Upper Stage Breakup, (Washington, D.C.: 1989).
 
 

Table Data From:

http://www.sunspot.noao.edu/NODO/nodo.html,
http://www.spacecom.af.mil/usspace/space.htm,
http://sn-callisto.jsc.nasa.gov/index.html,
http://www.spacecom.af.mil/usspacecom/cmotrivia.htm,
http://www.un.or.at/OOSA_Kiosk/spdeb/spdeb94/spdeb94.html,
http://www.nao.ac.jp,
http://www.crl.go.jp,
http://www.un.or.at/OOSA_Kiosk/spdeb/spdeb95/spger.html,
& emails from Mark Ulrooney 1/28/98 & Alan Blackburn 2/12/98.